If the homeland is the battlefield, where is Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s home?
Posted: April 22, 2013 Filed under: Development, News, Personal | Tags: Conflict Resolution, Culture, Identity, News Leave a commentMany sensible people have preached patience and prudence in the aftermath of the Boston bombings. I particularly agreed with the concerns of those who advocated against “fear”, such as Stephen Walt who argues we have given a disproportionate amount of attention to this issue. Michael Cohen of the Guardian similarly writes,
“But by letting one fugitive terrorist shut down a major American city, Boston not only bowed to outsize and irrational fears, but sent a dangerous message to every would-be terrorist – if you want to wreak havoc in the United States, intimidate its population and disrupt public order, here’s your instruction booklet.”
While I full-heartedly agree with these perspectives, my post will focus on the role of culture and identity in this case. The facts show that the surviving bomber is a ethnic Chechen who was born in Kyrgyzstan, came to the US from Russia as a legal refugee a decade ago, and recently became naturalized as an American citizen just last year. This can be very confusing to the traditional media narratives which explain terrorism and political violence. We often have a very essentialized perspective of what constitutes a terrorist, and prescribe pre-conceived identities to explain what we do not understand. Thus, it can be disconcerting when a person like Tsarnaev can appear to hold multiple identities and loyalties.
Yet it has been argued by many scholars (especially of the traditions of anthropology, post-colonialism, and philosophy) that modern society is characterized by a sense of rootlessness, in that our identities have become “de-territorialized”. Edward Said’s experiences as a Palestinian refugee who was effectively exiled from his homeland shaped his own philosophy, described this new world as “a generalized condition of homelessness”.
Like Said, the Tsarnaev brothers were also exiles, like the many refugees who left their homelands to avoid persecution and strife. While it is possible that the heart of an exile can bleed for the imagined home, reality shows that life is infinitely more complicated. Immigrants are torn between multiple identities, as they belong neither “there” or “here”. As a first generation Vietnamese-American, I can empathize with the difficulties of “fitting in”, when I am automatically prescribed an Asian identity at first look.
I do not know where Dzhokhar Tsarnaev considers home. His brother Tamerlan Tsarnaev has been quoted to not have any American friends or understand Americans; it is understandable that he may feel a sense of social exclusion from American society. Yet similar accounts by Dzhokhar’s peers describe Dzhokhar as quite sociable, “one of the crowd”, and even attended a party on that fateful night. It isn’t impossible that Dzhokhar feels connected to the country he spent the last decade in.
Yet it will be easier to think of Dzhokhar and his brother as external threats who snuck into the country and became radicalized by extremist ideology. This will be convenient to leaders who want to restrict immigration flows or restrict civil liberties in the interests of national security. This is why some have called for Dzhokhar to be tried as an “enemy combatant”, to further demonstrate his potential foreign ties. Lindsey Graham is leading the charge, along with other Republican lawmakers who seek to designate Tsarnaev as an enemy combatant.
“My concern is intelligence we can get from him, whether other people were involved, whether he’s dealt with other Islamist terrorists in the past, is there a Chechen base overseas [the Tsarnaev family is from Chechnya], [ties] to the Mideast, other cells?”
The media have proven quick to demonize Chechnya, and even the Czech ambassador had to disassociate his country from the geographically-ignorant to avoid the Internet rage. Even the Chechens themselves in Russia have denied involvement (why would it attack a country who is at worst, antipathetic to their interests and at best, a buffer against further Russian persecution?).
But even if Dzhokhar wakes up in the hospital and spouts undying loyalty to his lost homeland, why does this matter? We’re quick to associate a terrorist’s origins as the principal determinants to their violent motives, but this is still an incomplete picture of one’s identity. Amartya Sen argues in “Identity and Violence” that we possess multiple identities, and retain the agency to choose who we want to be at any particular moment. While it is granted that the menu of “choices” will be inherently limited by external circumstances (such as political exile), one’s culture is not one’s destiny as we still have the ability to choose. At that precise moment the Tsarnaev brothers chose to bomb the marathon, their chosen identity was the role of murderous criminals. While it may prove to be the case that Dzhokhar will express grievances about the Chechens’ plights, it would be insufficient to explain why he chose the citizens of Boston as his target.
We are making a classic (what is known in conflict resolution) “Type II” error when we overvalue Dzhokhar’s cultural identity as an ethnic Chechen to explain his actions. This leads the media and politicians seek to investigate and emphasize his foreign identity, which will more easily fit into the overcooked narratives of terrorists being from another country. A Type II error can define “culture as an agent capable of action on its own terms, essentialize culture toward a single and unified expression, (and) homogenize all group members toward invariant behavioral stereotypes” (from the Kevin Avruch article linked to above).
When we overemphasize one’s culture, one’s religion, or one’s homeland as the sole determinant of one’s actions, we ignore the individual’s responsibility to their own deeds. I can say it no better than Sarah Kendzior, who wrote, “Look to the two men who did it – and judge them by what they have done, not from where their ancestors came.” Therefore I hope we treat this man as a criminal, not another Orientalized bogeyman from abroad sent to provoke another round in our perpetual war on terror.
GDELT and Big Data- Why Theory Still Matters
Posted: April 17, 2013 Filed under: Big Data, Development, GDELT, Policy, Theory Leave a commentI’m really excited by the announcement of the GDELT (Global Data on Events, Location, and Tone) data set. Foreign Policy has done a great summary, and the Dart-Throwing Chimp has also written an insightful commentary on GDELT’s potential for the evolution of political science. You can also read the authors’ paper, which was recently presented at the ISA conference a few weeks ago.
At the risk of oversimplifying things, GDELT is a step towards building a giant database of everything. Political events such as diplomatic overtures, threats, and demonstrations can be visually mapped out and tracked over a specific period of time. By mapping out the occurrence of events, one can potentially use the data as a predictive tool, as James Yonamine did in his paper on tracking violence in Afghanistan.
More real-time work is being done by Alex Hanna on the Arab Spring and Rolf Fredheim on Russian protests (thanks for the tips so far!), and I look forward to contributing as soon as I become more familiar with R software. But in this post, I’ll focus on the normative and theoretical implications of GDELT and Big Data.
In Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Kenneth Cukier’s recent book, “Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think”, the authors emphasize how having more “messy” data can transform our traditional theories of causation in social science. Whereas social scientists once needed high quality and representative sample sizes for their data sets, researchers of today and tomorrow will have the luxuries of having an overwhelming deluge of data instead. The necessity of having a “valid” sample will be lessened, when you can potentially have “n=all” instead.
In a recent interview, Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger summarizes how our age-old model of the scientific method may be improved.
“So Big Data enables us not to test the hypothesis, but to let the data speak and tell us what hypothesis is best. And in that way it completely reshapes what we call the scientific method or — more generally speaking — how we understand and make sense of the world.”
The Big Data movement may potentially evolve our traditional notions of what constitutes “theory”, and in turn improve our understanding of what the world is like. Yet it becomes even more important to remain skeptical of the data which is presented. Skilled researchers must be aware of both GDELT’s own internal limitations, and its external implications for policymakers as well. John Beiler has also written a great piece on the theoretical implications of big data, in particularly what this means for social science theory.
“…I think the social sciences, and science in general, is about asking interesting questions of the data that will often require more finesse than taking an “ANALYZE ALL THE DATA” approach. Thus, while datasets like GDELT provide new opportunities, they are not opportunities to relax and let the data do the talking. If anything, big data generating processes will require more work on the part of the researcher than previous data sources.”
My takeaway from John’s points is that data in itself is not neutral, we must become especially more self-reflective about the parts of the data we are using. But I am even more concerned with the external and practical purposes of the data we have access to.
In the example of aid transparency, “Big Data” is inherently geared towards policy, academic, and donor elites who actually have the power to interpret and do things with these numbers, while the beneficiares of aid (often the rural and technologically-illiterate poor) are often disadvantaged. During a recent roundtable at ISA2013, I heard a story about an African government which had asked a aid transparency organization to disclose the names and location of civil society groups to find out where the aid was going. In this case, the government wanted to use the data to target the NGOs’ (who can be a threat to the state’s legitimacy in certain contexts) and put them in jail. The commentator went on to emphasize that no one really knows who is using open data, and there is no clear way to determine for what purpose.
In conclusion, information and “Big Data” are not apolitical, for information in itself is power. Power remains asymmetrically biased towards the actors who not only has access to big data and information, but also have the power to do things with it. Furthermore, big data cannot tell us what we should do with this information.
Regardless, I remain optimistic about the potential of big data to really evolve our traditional ways of thinking. I agree with John and Big Data’s authors in that more and more “messy” data will be more useful to improving our theories. Yet I remind myself that theories of power and politics are still relevant, perhaps more than ever.
“Big data is a resource and a tool. It is meant to inform, rather than explain; it points us toward understanding, but it can still lead to misunderstanding, depending on how well or poorly it is wielded. And however dazzling we find the power of big data to be, we much never let its seductive glimmer blind us to its inherent imperfections.” Page 197 of Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Kenneth Cukier’s”Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think”,

