Moved to DC

Sorry for not writing much, I figured I’d be more consistent with this blog. I have been preoccupied with school and logistical stuff lately, I’ll be more engaged in the blogosphere for the summer.

Big news for me. I’ve actually just moved to Washington DC to do a summer internship with the Center of Global Development on their Communications team. Working from inside a think tank will give me a valuable perspective on how the agenda-setting and policy process works in this powerful city.

I’m very new to DC, but I have a feeling I’m going to enjoy this life. I’m open to food suggestions and karaoke bars, and would always be open for drinks to chat development or politics (or the NBA Finals too, I need more basketball friends!).

Have a great summer everyone!


Uncertainty is a Warm Gun- The Future of 3D Printing, Gun Control, and Globalization

The recent passage of the UN Arms Trade Treaty by the General Assembly was a victory for civil society and human security activists, as the bill intends to curb the flow of arms trade by linking a country’s human rights record to its ability to acquire legal weapons. The United Nations is particularly aware of states’ concerns of impeding domestic sovereignty, and focuses only on “international sales” between states. The final resolution also emphasizes that the treaty will not affect existing domestic law, as the U.N. Office of Disarmament states that the treaty will not…

“interfere with domestic arms commerce or the right to bear arms in Member States; ban the export of any type of weapon; harm States’ legitimate right to self-defense; or undermine national arms regulation standards already in place.”

Despite this sign of deference to American concerns, Republican Senators remain particularly avowed against any sort of infringement of the 2nd Amendment, and its passage in the US Senate will be heavily disputed by the gun lobby and its powerful allies. Even if the bill doesn’t pass the Senate, broad acceptance of the treaty may breed civil society norms that will “shape the terrain” for future policymakers to better regulate arms control.

Yet recent developments in weapons manufacturing may threaten to change the entire ball game of regulatory regimes. Recently, Defense Distributed (a Texas-based non-profit group) has just announced that it has successfully tested its first-ever gun produced on a 3D printer. 3D guns is based off the additive manufacturing technology, which is a potentially revolutionary trend in manufacturing which will make it easier for firms and businesses to build small-scale objects like auto partsprosthetic hands, children’s toys.

Anti-gun advocates are up in arms about Defense Distributed, as they are rightly concerned about the likelihood that it will be easier to acquire guns through 3D printing. Senator Chuck Schumer has announced legislation to make 3D printed guns illegal. Claiming that while plastic guns will be easier to sneak past security measures which rely on metal detection, Schumer also warns of the possibility of high-risk individuals acquiring weapons more easily. “A terrorist, someone who’s mentally ill, a spousal abuser, a felon can essentially open a gun factory in their garage,” said Schumer.

Yet improved access to guns is Defense Distributed’s founder Cody Wilson’s very goal, as he envisions a future where anyone with a 3D printer can download the blueprints of 3D guns for free. Wilson philosophically believes that “every citizen has the right to bear arms, and his libertarian beliefs are further espoused in his denouncement of politicians like Obama and Romney as “globalist neo-liberals who exist to preserve the interests of this relatively autonomous class of Goldman Sachs bankers.”

Though many will disagree with Wilson’s political vision, it is difficult to dispute his point that regulatory laws in its default status is not prepared for his new world. Wilson argues in an March interview with VICE that the current debates on gun control are insufficient , stating “We’re trying to prove a point…you can do this in your bedroom…gun control doesn’t mean what it meant in 1984”. While it is unlikely he meant to reference the Orwellian ode against censorship and totalitarianism, it is clear that the current political discourses is not prepared for the future. Whether it is domestic legislation or international treaties, the current laws being negotiated are clearly inadequate if they cannot account for the rapid development of technologies such as 3D printing. It will be a muted victory for the UN’s supporters if Wilson’s world arrives at our doorstep, when prospective arms buyers can easily circumvent background checks by printing guns from home.

Kelsey Atherton rightly asserts that 3D guns in itself is not the issue at hand, and cites evidence that shows how people have been constructing guns without the need for a 3D printer. Rather, the key issue of 3D guns is the underlying potential of 3D printing that may have broader implications for the global economy. 3D printing can possibly render global supply chains obsolete or even reverse American manufacturing’s decline (to Obama’s delight). Though 3D printing technology is clearly in its infancy stage, Moore’s Law and Wright’s Law predicts that technology will rapidly evolve over time as the economics of scale improve the technology’s efficiency. Atherton further notes that the potential of 3D printing will rest on the ability to develop the right material infrastructure.

The implications of a rapidly improving 3D printing industry are still quite unclear. Note that Cody Wilson’s vision is heavily dependent upon the power of open source and Internet technology to send his blueprints all around the world. Therefore, it may be up to each sovereign country’s responsibility to decide whether this technology is legal (in the absence of strong global governance institutions to regulate the Internet). It is likely that state governments and industry groups will share a vested interest in seeing open source technology restricted.

But what if in the future, we can print human organs? What if we can customize and transmit an exact blueprint for a person in timely need of an organ transplant? What will be the laws that govern such practices? Who will determine what is legal and illegal, and what will be the enforcement mechanisms to regulate this? More questions are raised which cannot be presently answered, but we must be keen to consider them as this technology continues to develop.

In conclusion, only time will tell whether Cody Wilson and his 3D guns prove to be a mere blip in the matter of things, or the structural revolution which will fundamentally shift the global economy. If the latter case proves true, it will be vital that our current understandings of international politics (regarding arms control, international organizations, norms, cyberspace) and global economics (globalization, trade law, intellectual property rights) be able to account for the potential of 3D printing. Our policymakers should recall that regulation is always 3 steps behind innovation, and will need to recalibrate our laws if this trend proves to be more than just a shot in the dark.


If the homeland is the battlefield, where is Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s home?

Many sensible people have preached patience and prudence in the aftermath of the Boston bombings. I particularly agreed with the concerns of those who advocated against “fear”, such as Stephen Walt who argues we have given a disproportionate amount of attention to this issue. Michael Cohen of the Guardian similarly writes,

“But by letting one fugitive terrorist shut down a major American city, Boston not only bowed to outsize and irrational fears, but sent a dangerous message to every would-be terrorist – if you want to wreak havoc in the United States, intimidate its population and disrupt public order, here’s your instruction booklet.”

While I full-heartedly agree with these perspectives, my post will focus on the role of culture and identity in this case. The facts show that the surviving bomber is a ethnic Chechen who was born in Kyrgyzstan, came to the US from Russia as a legal refugee a decade ago, and recently became naturalized as an American citizen just last year. This can be very confusing to the traditional media narratives which explain terrorism and political violence. We often have a very essentialized perspective of what constitutes a terrorist, and prescribe pre-conceived identities to explain what we do not understand. Thus, it can be disconcerting when a person like Tsarnaev can appear to hold multiple identities and loyalties.

Yet it has been argued by many scholars (especially of the traditions of anthropology, post-colonialism, and philosophy) that modern society is characterized by a sense of rootlessness, in that our identities have become “de-territorialized”. Edward Said’s experiences as a Palestinian refugee who was effectively exiled from his homeland shaped his own philosophy, described this new world as “a generalized condition of homelessness”.

Like Said, the Tsarnaev brothers were also exiles, like the many refugees who left their homelands to avoid persecution and strife. While it is possible that the heart of an exile can bleed for the imagined home, reality shows that life is infinitely more complicated. Immigrants are torn between multiple identities, as they belong neither “there” or “here”. As a first generation Vietnamese-American, I can empathize with the difficulties of “fitting in”, when I am automatically prescribed an Asian identity at first look.

I do not know where Dzhokhar Tsarnaev considers home. His brother Tamerlan Tsarnaev has been quoted to not have any American friends or understand Americans; it is understandable that he may feel a sense of social exclusion from American society. Yet similar accounts by Dzhokhar’s peers describe Dzhokhar as quite sociable, “one of the crowd”, and even attended a party on that fateful night. It isn’t impossible that Dzhokhar feels connected to the country he spent the last decade in.

Yet it will be easier to think of Dzhokhar and his brother as external threats who snuck into the country and became radicalized by extremist ideology. This will be convenient to leaders who want to restrict immigration flows or restrict civil liberties in the interests of national security. This is why some have called for Dzhokhar to be tried as an “enemy combatant”, to further demonstrate his potential foreign ties. Lindsey Graham is leading the charge, along with other Republican lawmakers who seek to designate Tsarnaev as an enemy combatant.

“My concern is intelligence we can get from him, whether other people were involved, whether he’s dealt with other Islamist terrorists in the past, is there a Chechen base overseas [the Tsarnaev family is from Chechnya], [ties] to the Mideast, other cells?”

The media have proven quick to demonize Chechnya, and even the Czech ambassador had to disassociate his country from the geographically-ignorant to avoid the Internet rage. Even the Chechens themselves in Russia have denied involvement (why would it attack a country who is at worst, antipathetic to their interests and at best, a buffer against further Russian persecution?).

But even if Dzhokhar wakes up in the hospital and spouts undying loyalty to his lost homeland, why does this matter? We’re quick to associate a terrorist’s origins as the principal determinants to their violent motives, but this is still an incomplete picture of one’s identity. Amartya Sen argues in “Identity and Violence” that we possess multiple identities, and retain the agency to choose who we want to be at any particular moment. While it is granted that the menu of “choices” will be inherently limited by external circumstances (such as political exile), one’s culture is not one’s destiny as we still have the ability to choose. At that precise moment the Tsarnaev brothers chose to bomb the marathon, their chosen identity was the role of murderous criminals. While it may prove to be the case that Dzhokhar will express grievances about the Chechens’ plights, it would be insufficient to explain why he chose the citizens of Boston as his target.

We are making a classic (what is known in conflict resolution) “Type II” error when we overvalue Dzhokhar’s cultural identity as an ethnic Chechen to explain his actions. This leads the media and politicians seek to investigate and emphasize his foreign identity, which will more easily fit into the overcooked narratives of terrorists being from another country. A Type II error can define “culture as an agent capable of action on its own terms, essentialize culture toward a single and unified expression, (and) homogenize all group members toward invariant behavioral stereotypes” (from the Kevin Avruch article linked to above).

When we overemphasize one’s culture, one’s religion, or one’s homeland as the sole determinant of one’s actions, we ignore the individual’s responsibility to their own deeds. I can say it no better than Sarah Kendzior, who wrote, “Look to the two men who did it – and judge them by what they have done, not from where their ancestors came.” Therefore I hope we treat this man as a criminal, not another Orientalized bogeyman from abroad sent to provoke another round in our perpetual war on terror.


GDELT and Big Data- Why Theory Still Matters

I’m really excited by the announcement of the GDELT (Global Data on Events, Location, and Tone) data set. Foreign Policy has done a great summary, and the Dart-Throwing Chimp has also written an insightful commentary on GDELT’s potential for the evolution of political science. You can also read the authors’ paper, which was recently presented at the ISA conference a few weeks ago.

At the risk of oversimplifying things, GDELT is a step towards building a giant database of everything.  Political events such as diplomatic overtures, threats, and demonstrations can be visually mapped out and tracked over a specific period of time. By mapping out the occurrence of events, one can potentially use the data as a predictive tool, as James Yonamine did in his paper on tracking violence in Afghanistan.

Image

More real-time work is being done by Alex Hanna on the Arab Spring and Rolf Fredheim on Russian protests (thanks for the tips so far!),  and I look forward to contributing as soon as I become more familiar with R software. But in this post, I’ll focus on the normative and theoretical implications of GDELT and Big Data.

In Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Kenneth Cukier’s recent book, “Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think”, the authors emphasize how having more “messy” data can transform our traditional theories of causation in social science. Whereas social scientists once needed high quality and representative sample sizes for their data sets, researchers of today and tomorrow will have the luxuries of having an overwhelming deluge of data instead. The necessity of having a “valid” sample will be lessened, when you can potentially have “n=all” instead.

In a recent interview, Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger summarizes how our age-old model of the scientific method may be improved.

“So Big Data enables us not to test the hypothesis, but to let the data speak and tell us what hypothesis is best. And in that way it completely reshapes what we call the scientific method or — more generally speaking — how we understand and make sense of the world.”

The Big Data movement may potentially evolve our traditional notions of what constitutes “theory”, and in turn improve our understanding of what the world is like. Yet it becomes even more important to remain skeptical of the data which is presented. Skilled researchers must be aware of both GDELT’s own internal limitations, and its external implications for policymakers as well. John Beiler has also written a great piece on the theoretical implications of big data, in particularly what this means for social science theory.

“…I think the social sciences, and science in general, is about asking interesting questions of the data that will often require more finesse than taking an “ANALYZE ALL THE DATA” approach. Thus, while datasets like GDELT provide new opportunities, they are not opportunities to relax and let the data do the talking. If anything, big data generating processes will require more work on the part of the researcher than previous data sources.”

My takeaway from John’s points is that data in itself is not neutral, we must become especially more self-reflective about the parts of the data we are using. But I am even more concerned with the external and practical purposes of the data we have access to.

In the example of aid transparency, “Big Data” is inherently geared towards policy, academic, and donor elites who actually have the power to interpret and do things with these numbers, while the beneficiares of aid (often the rural and technologically-illiterate poor) are often disadvantaged. During a recent roundtable at ISA2013, I heard a story about an African government which had asked a aid transparency organization to disclose the names and location of civil society groups to find out where the aid was going. In this case, the government wanted to use the data to target the NGOs’ (who can be a threat to the state’s legitimacy in certain contexts) and put them in jail. The commentator went on to emphasize that no one really knows who is using open data, and there is no clear way to determine for what purpose.

In conclusion, information and “Big Data” are not apolitical, for information in itself is power. Power remains asymmetrically biased towards the actors who not only has access to big data and information, but also have the power to do things with it. Furthermore, big data cannot tell us what we should do with this information.

Regardless, I remain optimistic about the potential of big data to really evolve our traditional ways of thinking. I agree with John and Big Data’s authors in that more and more “messy” data will be more useful to improving our theories. Yet I remind myself that theories of power and politics are still relevant, perhaps more than ever.

 “Big data is a resource and a tool. It is meant to inform, rather than explain; it points us toward understanding, but it can still lead to misunderstanding, depending on how well or poorly it is wielded. And however dazzling we find the power of big data to be, we much never let its seductive glimmer blind us to its inherent imperfections.”  Page 197 of Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Kenneth Cukier’s”Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think”,


The “Academic-Policy” divide and the role of the citizen

Earlier this morning, the Duck of Minerva linked to a CNN commentary by UCSD’s Stephen Haggard who argues that Kim Jong-Un is not crazy, citing clues that the recent blustering is “ritualized escalation” for domestic political purposes. This isn’t exactly a mind-blowing argument, as most academics in social science would likely agree of the importance of understanding the domestic constraints to a political actor’s actions. Indeed, it is rare for a political leader to be “crazy”; my personal impression is that the young leader must act especially bellicose to consolidate his power among the military leaders.

But scroll a bit down to the article’s comments, and witness the overwhelming amount of disagreement to Haggard’s comments. Here are some of my favorite comments:

  • “This professor, in my opinion, has spent to way too much time in suspended academic animation, San Diego style. Maybe the professor is the one who is crazy. Maybe it’s the intoxicating sunset views of the pacific at UCSD that renders him unable to escape from that dream-induced world of his.”
  • “You are the problem.”
  • “I suppose that the same argument could be made that going into a party store with an exposed semi-automatic rifle and wearing a ski mask doesn’t mean you intend to rob it or hurt anyone. I know that argument works great with the police right?”

So on and so forth, rare was the voice that agreed with Kelly’s analysis.

It is naturally elitist of academics to dismiss the voices of the online mob; winning arguments on the Youtube comments section is often times a lost cause. I wouldn’t blame any reasonable person in academia with giving up entirely on communicating their ideas to the masses, it’s much more rational for an academic to cater their arguments to the policy community.

However, I do wonder. Policymakers, politicians, and bureaucrats are tied (indirectly and directly) to the concerns of the greater citizen public, for all its good and bad.

Conventions and conferences like the recent ISA 2013 at San Francisco are often ripe with discussions about the “theory-practice” divide, where academics lament the lack of attention policymakers give to their ideas. At a thought-provoking panel about Rio +20 and the future of sustainable development, we wondered why there was virtually zero representation of UN/State Dept/think tank’ish/CSO/NGO delegates in the room. I’m sure this scene is replicated in nearly every panel, where are all the policy wonks and activists who may benefit from academic knowledge?

While the “theory-practice” divide is given much attention by various academics and bloggers, I’ll pose a different question instead. What are the implications of academia ignoring the conversation with the greater public audience (especially the people misinformed about China holding all our money)?

My hypothesis follows that, IF citizens can significantly influence the agenda of policymakers (ideally so in a representative democracy!), and IF academics want to influence the agenda of policymakers (strong disconnect between what academics and policymakers are most concerned about), it would follow that academics need to be better at engaging the citizen public at large.

(of course, this is contingent upon policymakers caring about their constituents, whether or not citizens even disagree with most policymakers, etc etc)

I’m not suggesting it’s the academics’ fault for the public’s many misconceptions. 37% of Americans believe global warming is a hoax, 28% believe Saddam was involved in 9/11, etc etc (but at least only 5% believe Paul McCartney is dead!). The media is heavily complicit in spreading false assumptions too, perhaps the most culpable of all.

But academics seem to cede the battle entirely, with most of their work being directed towards each other, policymakers, and civil society elites. While this is perfectly understandable, considering the day-to-day incentives and constraints of an academic scholar, I wonder what we lose by ignoring the public sphere completely. There must be some cost, when academics cannot communicate their ideas and perspectives to the larger community as well.

I do believe that there are inherent limits to telling somebody the truth about something, the rational actor does not exist in the collective sphere. I would hope that academics continue to explore more creative mediums to teach the greater public, such as film documentaries and interviews that may connect with people on a more emotive perspective.

That’s why Stephen Colbert’s whole “truthiness” gag is peculiar to me. While the whole Colbert bit is obviously sarcastic, I do feel that people can’t experience truth through knowledge alone. Though we’re living in the big data/information age, let’s not forget that people will instinctively trust their gut when confronted with counter-intuitive knowledge.

What are your thoughts?


Just Be You

The residual effects from the ISA’s Blogging Reception must be diffusing, I now feel inspired to finally launch this blog that I’ve been pondering about for a while.

(actually, it might just be the beer. Yeah that’s it).

I was lucky enough to receive extremely constructive advice from Dan Nexon, Charli Carpenter, Erica Chenoweth, Will Winecoff, and Sarah Bauerle Danzman during the ISA 2013 convention so far. So here’s to you all, your friendly words may be the push I needed. I’ll also blame you if it all goes down in flames too.

I had a quasi-existential crisis this afternoon during a panel honoring Richard Falk, a professor whom I admire deeply for his ability to speak truth to power despite the consequences (Also, UCSB loyalty!).  I’m still figuring out where I fit in the big scheme of things, (between policy and academia?) as it’s difficult to balance out my multiple identities and ambitions.

(Vietnamese-American, California, a lover of old books and social science theory, a soft spot for existentialist philosophy and short-form sci-fi, NBA and European football nerd, empathetic humanist,”theory vs practice”, development economics/political science/intl relations, U2.)

In the midst of all this, Rob Walker simply advised me, “Just be you”. If only I could pick one.

Whatever. Just start writing. Perhaps I’ll figure it out along the way.